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Neuroscience is a multidisciplinary effort to understand the structures and functions
of the brain and brain-mind relations. This effort results in an increasing amount of
data, generated by sophisticated technologies. However, these data enhance our
descriptive knowledge, rather than improve our understanding of brain functions.
This is caused by methodological gaps both within and between subdisciplines
constituting neuroscience, and the atomistic approach that limits the study of macro-
and mesoscopic issues. Whole-brain measurement technologies do not resolve these
issues, but rather aggravate them by the complexity problem. The present article is
devoted to methodological and epistemic problems that obstruct the development of
human neuroscience. We neither discuss ontological questions (e.g., the nature of the
mind) nor review data, except when it is necessary to demonstrate a methodological
issue. As regards intradisciplinary methodological problems, we concentrate on those
within neurobiology (e.g., the gap between electrical and chemical approaches to
neurophysiological processes) and psychology (missing theoretical concepts). As
regards interdisciplinary problems, we suggest that core disciplines of neuroscience can
be integrated using systemic concepts that also entail human-environment relations. We
emphasize the necessity of a meta-discussion that should entail a closer cooperation
with philosophy as a discipline of systematic reflection. The atomistic reduction should
be complemented by the explicit consideration of the embodiedness of the brain and the
embeddedness of humans. The discussion is aimed at the development of an explicit
methodology of integrative human neuroscience, which will not only link different fields
and levels, but also help in understanding clinical phenomena.
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INTRODUCTION: THE MOSAIC OF THE
NEUROSCIENCES
Neuroscience has provided a huge amount of knowledge of the
structure and function of the brain. However, an increasing
number of publications makes it difficult to estimate the
epistemic value of these results, their interpretations and their
practical relevance. For this reason, we want to discuss some
methodological problems that arise in different branches of
neuroscience that may hinder integration of these branches
into a unitary science. Methodology in this context does not
mean merely listing presently used techniques but a theory
of the epistemic value of these techniques. This goal, i.e., an
analysis of the methodology of neuroscience, is concretized
below in Section ‘‘The Aims of the Article’’. To avoid
misunderstanding, we should first say what this article is
not about.
It is not a comprehensive review of facts and findings of
neuroscience. Such a review is hardly possible within a limited
volume of a journal article. Accordingly, we do not claim
that our analysis is a balanced reflection of the actual trends
and advances of neuroscience; particularly, it is rather brain-
centered and may therefore underestimate the importance of
the studies of the peripheral nervous system. Also, we do
not discuss ontological aspects of neuroscience. Such questions
as ‘‘Are brain and mind identical?’’ or ‘‘Does human ‘‘self’’
really exist?’’, however intriguing they are, have no place in
this text. The article is not about what the brain and mind
are, but rather, about whether and how we (mis)understand
them.
Terminology, Epistemic Objects and
Self-Understanding of Neurosciences
Neuroscience is the multidisciplinary study of those who
are ‘‘working on the nervous system’’ (e.g., Journal of
Neuroscience1). Neuroscience involves disciplines ranging from
physics over biology to psychiatry and psychology and
pretends to include sociology, economics and anthropology.
This interdisciplinary character of neuroscience has a charming
affordance for cooperation across nearly all academic fields. On
the other hand, this plurality overshadows the serious conceptual,
methodological and theoretical problems both within each
participating discipline and between them. Combinations of
different scientific disciplines suggest interdisciplinary linkages
between different concepts, methodological strategies and
contexts. Thus we find composite hybrid-disciplines such as
neurophysics and neurochemistry, but also neuroeconomics,
neuroethics, etc. However, these research areas are applications
of the corresponding classical disciplines with their specific
methodology.
Each component in this mosaic of the participating academic
disciplines has its specific epistemic objects, concepts, techniques,
methodologies, paradigms, models and theories and operates
in different contexts. Therefore, each component approaches
the common set of questions (e.g., ‘‘How does the brain
1http://www.jneurosci.org/site/misc/about.xhtml
work?’’; ‘‘How is its work linked with our human experience?’’)
from a specific viewpoint. It is not yet clear how that
heterogeneous ‘‘multitude of perspectives’’ will contribute to
an integrated understanding of the brain and its functions
(Chalmers, 1996; Latour, 1999; Block, 2007). What are the
conceptual, methodological and epistemological requirements
that neuroscience should fulfil to construct an integrated and
consistent picture of mind and brain?
Can the Subdisciplines of Neuroscience
Be Integrated?
This general question can be specialized in several
methodological questions:
– How close are the views of the different neuroscientific
disciplines to each other? Are these views only associatively
related to each other, do they complement or even overlap each
other?
– Should we accept the methodological plurality, or can we
reduce ‘‘higher level’’ disciplines to ‘‘lower-level’’ disciplines?
Does the notion of ‘‘integration’’ (if, e.g., psychology would
be integrated into neuroscience) imply that the corresponding
discipline would lose its specific status and fully dissolve in
the new disciplinary complex? If yes, does it hold true for all
participating disciplines or only for some of them? Does the
richness of the relationships between neuroscience and other
sciences indicate that neuroscience is a universal or unifying
science? Do concepts and methods of neuroscience replace or
integrate concepts and methods of other disciplines?
– Do we have a strict methodology in neuroscience that,
e.g., reminds that any localization of mental functions must
demonstrate not only the necessity of the respective structure
for a specific function but also its sufficiency for this function?
– Do we have sufficient theories already? Do mathematical
models capture mental phenomena?
Presently, we do not claim to answer these great methodological
questions. We also do not propose any specific perspective,
although we have a clear preference for a systemic and even
ecological extension of the view of neuroscience; but this view
should be worked out later in a special initiative.
The Aims of the Article
Regarding these basic questions, in the following sections we shall
discuss six main points:
First, we shall give an overview on common taxonomies
of science to delineate borders between the disciplines
participating in neuroscience.
Second, we shall elucidate specific methodological problems
existing within neurobiology as a natural science and how these
problems complicate the attempts to relate neurobiology to
mental functions.
Third, we shall explore current intra-disciplinary problems of
psychology because any studies of the neural basis of mental
functions cannot be better than the concepts, methods and
theories of psychology that are used there.
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Fourth, we shall analyze principal methodological difficulties
in the studies of mind-brain relations; these methodological
issues can carefully be put apart from the metaphysical aspects
of the mind/brain problem.
Fifth, we shall summarize the advances of integrating modern
philosophy with its various subdisciplines into the ensemble of
neuroscientific disciplines.
Finally, we shall describe the prospective utility of Systems
Science as a potentially powerful integrator of neurosciences.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE FIELD
OF NEUROSCIENCES
Summary
An essential methodological pluralism of neuroscience appears
necessary independently of the ontological position of a
researcher (i.e., monism, dualism, or pluralism). Regarding
methodological reductionism, we do not rule out the possibility
to reduce some aspects of cognitions and emotions (e.g.,
impaired working memory) to their neural basis (e.g., deficient
prefrontal networks: Schaffner, 2013), but such partial reductions
do not yet prove the possibility to reduce the whole. Furthermore,
integration cannot be regarded as a simple coexistence
of concepts from different subdisciplines, but presumes a
considerable overlap of these concepts.
Some Preliminary Distinctions
Structuring the field of sciences is a subject of the history
of science (Hacking, 2002) and the philosophy of science
(Bunge, 1998). One basic dichotomy is that between ‘‘factual’’
(empirical) and ‘‘structural’’ (theoretical) sciences (Bunge, 1998).
Examples of the latter are cybernetics, mathematics and
systems science. More detailed analyses of similarities and
differences between sciences and their practical applications
are often used to construct taxonomies of sciences (Bunge,
1998). A scientific discipline—for instance, psychology or
neurobiology—can be characterized by its epistemic object
(mind/brain), its concepts (consciousness/discharge pattern), its
methods (questionnaires/EEG), its quality of data scales (ordinal
behavioral data/rational voltage changes), by specific phenomena
(anxiety/neuronal activity) and its theories (frustration theory of
aggression/Hodgkin-Huxley-equation). Different disciplines also
frequently have different implicit ontological and metaphysical
assumptions. Neuroscience as an epistemic program is based on
a very heterogeneous set of concepts, methods, paradigms and
theories. Successful integration would imply the need to define
each participating scientific discipline in order for them to be able
to support each other.
First, regarding the epistemic objects of scientific investigation
the core disciplines of neuroscience study electrically active
molecular structures (e.g., ion channels; physics), gene
expression (genetics), synaptic processing (molecular biology,
pharmacology), growth and wiring of neurons (histology),
structure of brain areas (anatomy), or plasticity of circuits
(physiology). The great challenge for neuroscience is related
to neural mechanisms of ‘‘higher’’ or ‘‘mental’’ information
processing (psychology). Disciplines like psychology can also
work without referring to a material substrate like the nervous
system.
Second, regarding the concepts, some of them (like discharge
or BOLD signal) are technology-based observational terms
emerging from physical measurements, while others (like
consciousness or sensation) are subject-related observational
categories.
Third, regarding the methods, there exist sophisticated
physico-chemical measurement technologies in the present
neurobiological laboratory. The opposite pole is presented by
data that rely on verbal reports specific for psychology or
sociology. Somewhere in the middle are methods of direct
observation of behavior, which can be of different level of
complexity and result in data varying from purely qualitative
observations to exact records that allow strict mathematical
analyses, e.g., in kinesiology. Techniques alone, which can
be learned within a few months, are not sufficient for the
appropriate interpretation of results without the theoretical
context underlying these techniques. A psychologist can record
single cell activity and a physicist can perform an experiment
in social psychology, but this does not yet mean that they really
know how to conceive of the data they obtained.
Fourth, the quality of data can be used to distinguish ‘‘hard’’
sciences like physics with interval or rational data from ‘‘soft’’
sciences such as sociology that is based to a large amount on
qualitative or ordinal data. This implicates a proper choice of
statistical tools for data analysis.
Fifth, discipline-specific phenomena that drive specific
research can be identified. On the one hand, some of these
phenomena have originally come from philosophy (the self) or
folk psychology (attention). On the other hand, purely physical
(e.g., electrical) phenomena can also belong to the domain of
neuroscience.
Sixth, theories can be expressed on a highly elaborated formal
level, or only formulated on a verbal level.
Reviewing these criteria, the roughest dual classification
of the (empirical) sciences distinguishes between natural and
social sciences (‘‘humanities’’; e.g., Dilthey, 1907/1954; Von
Wright, 1971). Many authors further distinguish between ‘‘mind
sciences’’ and ‘‘social sciences’’ properly, which leads to a
trichotomy rather than dichotomy. The argument runs that
the social domain emerges as a relatively autonomous system
that cannot be reduced to single persons or even groups or
populations of humans (e.g., Luhmann, 1994; Mayntz, 2006).
Social issues, according to Durkheim (1895/1982), are not merely
the presence of other persons but real or virtual interpersonal
relations like expectations of behavior or expectations of
expectations. If social processes cannot be reduced to individual
behavior, they can be related but not reduced to individual
neurobiology.
A resulting tripartition of the sciences reminds of the
‘‘three worlds’’ of Popper (1972) who distinguished a
‘‘world 3’’ of cultural artifacts from the mental ‘‘world 2’’
and physical ‘‘world 1’’. Similar three-world conceptions were
also suggested by other philosophers (Frege, 1918; Carnap,
1967/2003).
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One can argue, however, that important differences exist not
only between the mental world and the social world, but also
between the social world and the cultural world. Therefore, more
and more fine-graded classifications are possible.
Boundaries Between the Neurosciences
Already at the first glance the number of differences between
the various disciplines makes it inappropriate to include purely
psychological studies into ‘‘neuroscience’’ because the data of
such studies only indirectly indicate processes in the participants’
brain. Therefore, we prefer a narrow definition: a study belongs
to neuroscience only if it also uses physical or chemical
measures of the structure and the actions of the nervous system.
A neuroscientist is a person who is registering, analyzing,
manipulating or modeling a physico-chemical property of the
nervous system.
A Dual Structure of the Neurosciences
The simplest classification of sciences (i.e., natural vs.
social/cultural sciences) would roughly correspond to a
dichotomy between the basic neurosciences, which studies
the ‘‘isolated’’ brain, and another field of behavioral, affective
and cognitive neuroscience (BACN), which studies aspects of
the brain as a part of the organism-environment system. The
former is a purely natural science and investigates structures
and processes in the nervous system using methods of natural
sciences. The latter looks for relationships between these
physiological processes and a different class of processes called
‘‘psychological’’. This division between the basic neuroscience
and BACN can be criticized and overcome in a further discussion
but it is necessary as a starting and branching point.
Such a dichotomy roots, first of all, in the history,
because neuroscience developed mainly from neuroanatomy and
neurophysiology. This essentially biological approach remains
the basis of all other (cognitive, social, ethical, etc.) neurosciences
also in the sense that any methodological flaw at this basic level
necessarily leads to misconceptions at all other (‘‘upper’’) levels.
The neuroscience as a purely natural science completely relies on
conceptualizations of experimental or theoretically-derived data
based on the third person perspective. In contrast, BACN has to
take into account also the first-person perspective.
This distinction is also important because it is precisely BACN
that is the object of great social debates. The public attention
is bound not to details of electrical and chemical processes
occurring in neurons and glial cells, but to how these processes
are related to our feelings, decisions and (social) behaviors. Thus
we have to consider the methodological issues of BACN, as it
entails steady comparison between the data obtained using the
methods of natural sciences, on the one hand, and those obtained
using the methods of ‘‘humanities’’, on the other hand.
Social Neuroscience—The Neurobiology of the
Second Person Perspective?
If social processes cannot be reduced to the processes ‘‘under the
skin’’ of a single human, then social neuroscience also cannot
be reduced to BACN. Therefore, social neuroscience may be
regarded as a third field of neuroscience (Society for Social
Neuroscience, 2014).
Social behavior of humans obviously includes general
psychological components such as perception, cognition,
memory, etc. However, the question is whether the
corresponding neuronal brain networks involved in processing
social stimuli are different from the networks involved in these
general mental processes. An example of social neuroscience
might be, e.g., a study of how the brain is working when a subject
is involved in political affairs. This type of studies is closely
related to the quest for a ‘‘cultural neuroscience’’ (Han et al.,
2013).
Another frequently forgotten aspect is that the social
component interferes in each experiment in human
neuroscience: whenever an experimenter tries to obtain the
informed consent from a human subject and discusses the
conditions of the experiment with the subject, this is already a
social process that can considerably affect experimental results.
Interdisciplinarity, Reduction or Integration
of Methods?
We tried to show that neurosciences could rely on several
methodologically different disciplines. In this relation, Northoff
(2014a,b) speaks about our structural and functional brain our
mental brain and our sociocultural brain. When, however, an
integrated picture of the brain and its functions is aimed, three
different strategies may be used.
Reduction
The most respectable tradition in neuroscience is to dare the
great challenge of reduction of all this disciplinary complexity
to neurobiology. This is not the only tradition. Many brilliant
neuroscientists rejected the idea of reduction, including Gustav
Fritsch, Sir Charles Sherrington, Sir Edgar Adrian, Sir John
Eccles, Wilder Penfield, Ragnar Granit and many others. But
the reductionist stance plays nowadays a particularly strong part.
As stated above, the core of neuroscience is a natural science of
neurobiology. If, however, neuroscience claims to explore mental
and social events, it has to employ knowledge and methods going
beyond its biological core, i.e., those of psychology, sociology
and perhaps other disciplines. To be successful, such a reduction
has to fulfil at least two criteria, i.e., to replace mental concepts
with neurophysiological concepts (conceptual reduction) and
to discover bridge laws that would permit to deduce mental
processes from physiological processes (theoretical reduction;
Nagel, 1961; Rosen, 1991).
At least presently, there is no sign of how the two above
criteria could be fulfilled2. Therefore, the methodology of
neuroscience is necessarily pluralistic, or at least dualistic. Note
that this methodological pluralism does not mean a metaphysical
pluralism or dualism, but can well agree with a metaphysical
2An example from Kotchoubey (2007) shows how difficult this venture is: if,
e.g., we say ‘‘my prefrontal networks process complex information’’ instead
of, I think, this would not result in any conceptual reduction, because the
term ‘‘my’’ in the latter expressions still remains a mental concept indicating
the existence of some ‘‘me’’.
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monism. We can believe that ‘‘at the very end’’ pain and
activation in the pain matrix of the brain are one and the same
thing, but in a particular neuroscientific study, we necessarily use
two different approaches to pain, such as subjective reports and
direct brain measures.
Pluralistic methodology
An alternative to reductionism can be the ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’
of neuroscience, easily understood in the anarchistic sense of
‘‘non-disciplinarity’’ or even ‘‘antidisciplinarity’’ (Feyerabend,
1975). We think, to the contrary, that the real interdisciplinary
collaboration requires clear awareness of, and a critical attitude
to, the limits of any discipline that is given by its traditional
subject, current concepts, methods and theories. Using a
microscope is not sociology and using a clinical interview is
not biology. Additionally, the methodological integration of
practical applications of neuroscience (e.g., in medicine) is
an important aspect that will permit us to go beyond the
mere ‘‘interdisciplinarity’’ into the domain of that has been
called ‘‘transdisplinarity’’ (Mittelstrass, 2011). Transciplinarity is
characterized by the equipotent interaction between researchers
and practitioners.
Perspectives of an integrative neuroscience
The third, integrative approach to neuroscience is opposed
to both reductionism and unstructured pluralism. However,
what does ‘‘integrative’’ mean? Any attempt to develop an
integrative neuroscience has to deal with epistemic compatibility
of the various methods. The usual solely additive combination
of methods and levels may not be sufficient to construct a
comprehensive picture of neuropsychological phenomena. Only
theoretical efforts seem to promise integration by building
conceptual bridges. Integration is not a juxtaposition of concepts,
but rather their overlap.
An open question remains, however: does integration warrant
identity of the component disciplines or lead to resolving the
borders and fusing the disciplines? This issue should be discussed
intensively in the context of methodology of neuroscience.
Such semantic aspects are only vaguely depicted by
stakeholders of the program of an integrative neuroscience.
Some examples (without a claim for completeness) are: (i)
journals aiming at a synthesis of the results of brain research
for understanding complex behavior (Frontiers in Integrative
Neuroscience, 2015) or at the integration across ‘‘hierarchical
levels’’ (World Scientific Journal of Integrative Neuroscience,
2015); (ii) research institutions targeting integrative multi-
level research including humanities (University of Tübingen,
Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, 2015); (iii) educational
programs also aiming at the integration of perspectives including
anthropology, philosophy, history (Binghampton University)3
and computational science (Fordham University)4.
3‘‘Distribution requirements are derived from the mathematics, chemistry
and physics departments; and electives can come from departments
such as anthropology, philosophy and history’’ (http://www2.binghamton.
edu/integrative-neuroscience/).
4‘‘A unique aspect of the integrative neuroscience major is the presence of
three tracks (cell and molecular, cognitive and systems and computational),
Unfortunately, problems of integration do not start only when
we are trying to connect several disciplinary traditions. Rather,
particular disciplines have their own internal methodological
gaps that should be minded when they contact each other.
NEUROBIOLOGY—SOME
INTRADISCIPLINARY METHODOLOGICAL
DIFFICULTIES
Summary
There are considerable internal methodological problems within
the purely neurophysiological division of neuroscience. Neither
plenty of data, nor the diversity of techniques can yield
profound understanding without general principles of brain
function. These problems can undermine the whole project of
neurobiological explanation of mind. Amisconception regarding
neurophysiological basis of a brain phenomenon results in a high
probability of wrong hypotheses about how this phenomenon is
related to mind and behavior.
Experimental Neurobiology: Do More Data
Implicate More Understanding?
Empirical research in neuroscience is largely technology-
driven: imaging studies, electrical and magnetic stimulation
and recording methods, microarrays, optogenetics, etc. are
rapidly developing technologies that generate more and more
data. We have now unprecedented access to the complex
spatial-temporal patterns of electrical activity and biochemical
processes accompanying specific cognitive or behavioral
states.
Such large-scale and multi-site recordings of spatial-temporal
electrochemical patterns may fill an important gap in empirical
brain research, namely the hiatus between molecular-cellular
and systems neuroscience. However, there are still serious
challenges, such as the enormous diversity and complexity of
neurons, beginning with their multimodal classification systems
involving electrophysiology, cytology, histology, biochemistry
and molecular biology. It turns out extremely difficult to
unravel neuronal connectivity and signaling even in relatively
simple model systems. An unanswered question is how far
we may generalize from less complete data and experimental
models. How much diversity must be considered to explain
brain phenomena, and how much can we rely on general
principles?
Unfortunately, errors at this level can undermine the whole
project of neurobiological explanation of mind. Thus a few
decades ago many scientists claimed that voluntary choice is
an illusion after Libet (1985) showed that readiness potential
(RP) appears long before the subjects make their voluntary
choice. Now the falsity of this conclusion became obvious as
we learned that RP, related to the activity of the premotor
cortex, cannot be responsible for a choice of some particular
movement (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008). A fissure in the
each focusing on a specific aspect of neuroscience’’ (http://www.fordham.
edu/academics/programs_at_fordham_/integrative_neurosci/).
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basement of a building makes unstable all floors that are built
upon it.
Heterogeneous data, ever increasing in amount, are analyzed
by sophisticated multivariate techniques. As a result, data mining
substitutes theory-driven considerations in several fields of
neuroscience. Large amounts of data enrich our descriptive
knowledge but not necessarily imply high explanatory power. The
explanatory power depends on the strength of principles that
have high heuristic potential. Explanation is an account that
allows to subsume a new observation to a general regularity:
the force of a crashing car can be described, explained and
predicted by the laws of motion by Newton, if the mass
and the acceleration of the car are known. No comparable
general principles that explain mental events and their neural
basis are known in brain research (Craver, 2007). Some
suggest that a mechanistic explanation is sufficient if a micro-
mechanism can explain a macro-phenomenon. However, this
becomes increasingly difficult when moving towards higher-
level functions. Already the understanding of neuronal network
synchronization engages hundreds of experimentalists and
modelers, many of whom do not start with such basics as
ion channel activity but rather at the level of neuronal spike
trains. Explaining the interactions between different brain
areas on the basis of ion channels will be an even more
difficult task.
The most extreme explanatory power of principles derived
from experimental research would be a complete deterministic
explanation of the brain, as exemplified in Laplace’s famous
‘‘demon’’, that was suggested to predict everything in the
future on the basis of the knowledge on the position and
the velocity of each single particle in the present. Beyond
possessing this universal set of data, the demon has, of
course, to know all basic physical laws. The necessity of
this additional, i.e., theoretical, knowledge was so obvious
for Laplace that he even did not worry to mention it
explicitly.
However, there is no law in neuroscience whose status might
be compared with that of Newton’s laws. Therefore, even if
Laplace is right and even if his demon knows every single atom
and ion in the brain, it would not be able to predict future
behavior, because it does not know those general laws that
determine the dynamics of the system.
Different Methods—Different or Integrated
Pictures of the Brain?
The methodological diversity of modern neurobiology is a very
positive development because each method possesses its own
advantages and disadvantages and, thus, different methods can
successfully complement each other. However, the belief that
‘‘more different methods’’ would automatically yield deeper
understanding of how the brain works is not much better
than the belief that ‘‘more data’’ would yield such deeper
understanding.
Already the conceptual link between chemical and electrical
signaling in synaptic transmission is not sufficiently understood:
the synapses with their multiple feedback loops (Abbott and
Regehr, 2004) are not switches or transformers but adaptive
filters, forming highly complex micro-processors. Further, the
spatial and the temporal domain are not yet linked directly
to each other: fMRI has a good spatial resolution, EEG
has good temporal resolution, and the relationship between
both signals is still subject to research, despite considerable
progress. In the 1990s the technical problem of how to
combine the two was solved, but notably, this technical
progress has not been accompanied by a corresponding
progress in scientific knowledge. Simultaneous EEG/fMRI
recording is still rarely performed, and it has not yet
resulted in any major breakthrough. Thus beyond technical
opportunities, theoretical and conceptual ideas are necessary. To
usefully perform a combined event-related potential (ERP)/fMRI
registration, we should ask the question: which specific theory
of brain function could be tested by this registration (Platt,
1964)?
Despite these challenges of methodological integration,
combined recordings with different technical methods
addressing the relation between macro-level and micro-level
are of eminent importance, especially the correlation of fMRI
data with single unit activity (Logothetis, 2008). However, the
fundamental question of whether a combination of technologies
can close the epistemic gaps between different system levels
remains open.
Data Analysis and Modeling
Most techniques of data analysis imply a sort of separation
between ‘‘signal’’ and ‘‘noise’’. This separation process
frequently involves spatial and temporal averaging, filtering,
smoothing, or normalization, i.e., reduction to a Gaussian
form. Doing so, we additionally reduce the set of data
which is already extremely small as compared with what
is really going on in the brain at that time. In the basis
of these procedures lies the idea formulated by William
James that ‘‘The art of being wise is the art of knowing
what to overlook’’. A lot of data is overlooked when
we extract their ‘‘substantial’’ part and ignore the ‘‘less
important’’ one.
The exact meaning of the notions ‘‘signal’’ and ‘‘noise’’ is,
however, not always clear. Often the signal is defined as the
activity pattern that remains stable with stimulus repetition,
whereas noise is everything which changes from one stimulus
presentation to another one. However, sometimes it is exactly
the change which is of most interest, e.g., in case of habituation,
fatigue and plasticity. This limitation is particularly serious if
we compare such data with the contents of consciousness, while
knowing that consciousness is rather a stream than a state.
The poor temporal resolution of many sophisticated techniques
we use for study of the human brain further aggravates this
problem.
Another definition of signal is the exact time-locking of the
brain activation to a stimulus presented by an experimenter.
All the remaining activity, which is not time- and phase-
locked to this stimulus, is declared ‘‘noise’’. Kotchoubey
(2006) characterized this view as a ‘‘mania grandiosa’’ of the
experimenter who believes that the human brain, bombarded
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by thousands of stimuli every moment, is particularly busy
with that one stimulus that he (the experimenter) is interested
in. In fact, phase-locked and non-phase-locked, as well as
pre-and post-stimulus EEG effects relate to each other, and
processes starting as anticipatory activations prior to stimulus
presentation may continue after this presentation modifying
so-called ‘‘responses’’ to stimuli (Fingelkurts et al., 2002, 2003;
Kotchoubey, 2006). When our attempts to concentrate only
on the useful portion of the brain signal are combined with
the lack of an adequate definition of ‘‘usefulness’’, terabytes of
information already available are lost.
Ways to overcome these limitations are sought for in
data-driven modeling that has become an important approach
in many fields of experimental neurobiology. This approach
starts with the choice of the appropriate mathematical method
that can reduce complexity of the data, especially those coming
from new high throughput technologies such as microarrays.
Therefore, tools from multivariate statistics are used (principal
component analysis, cluster analysis, independent component
analysis, support vector machines, etc.).
By these procedures, for instance, machine-based algorithms
can be constructed that allow to classify data patterns into
‘‘pathologic’’ or ‘‘normal’’ categories. As humans have difficulties
with comprehending data representations by visual displays
that extend more than 5–7 variables, machine-based algorithms
are unavoidable. At present, the methodological commitment
is devoted to exploring ‘‘big data’’ sets with sophisticated
mathematical tools that allow for the identification of clusters
that help to predict behavior patterns. Neuroscience continues
this development largely starting in molecular systems biology
with its strong roots in mathematics (Kitano, 2002; Le Novère,
2007; Tretter et al., 2010).
Animal Experiments—How Validly Do They
Represent Human Mental States?
Animal experiments are unavoidable in brain research. Our
knowledge on the mechanisms underlying some neurological
diseases (such as epilepsy) is mostly based on such experiments.
Regarding psychiatric diseases, however, the development and
choice of appropriate animal models is still an issue of
debate (Koch, 2006). There is no appropriate animal model
of shame, guilt, or paranoia; however, these phenomena
are of huge importance in mental diseases. Animal models
based on behaviorist epistemology, and even highly elaborated
experimental designs (e.g., inducing depressive behavior by
deprivation from mother animals) cannot capture significant
pathological features (e.g., feeling listless and committing
suicide).
PSYCHOLOGY: BEHAVIOR AND
SUBJECTIVITY
Summary
The aim of human neuroscience is frequently regarded as a
search for ‘‘neural underpinnings of’’ mental functions. This
understanding presumes that mind sciences (mainly psychology,
but also psychiatry and psychopathology) already have at least
an approximate list of the functions whose underpinnings we
have to investigate. However, presently there is no such list.
There is a steady tension between the uncritical use of everyday
words, on the one hand, and a loss of any link between the
operational definitions of a term and its phenomenality, on the
other hand. At the same time, a new conceptual framework
arises that may be regarded as a first step to integration
of clinical phenomenology, neurobiology and computational
psychology.
Another conflict within the present-day psychology is
between first-person and third-person perspectives. Any
reduction of one of them to the other one seems inappropriate.
Rather, a process of integration can profit from the acceptance
of methodological dualism between behaviorist/neurobiological
and experiential/phenomenological positions. From a purist’s
standpoint, this may appear awkward and can eventually
produce category errors. From an eclecticist’s standpoint,
however, this status reflects an unsolved mind-body debate in a
warranted position of ‘‘live-and-let-live’’.
Objects of Psychology and Duality
of Methodology
If psychology is defined as the science of experience and behavior
(Zimbardo and Johnson, 2011), it has two different kinds of
epistemic objects: on the one hand, first-person phenomena
that apparently do not have precise spatial localization and
extension, on the other hand, observable behavioral changes that
can be identified exactly in space and time. This juxtaposition of
phenomenal concepts (experience) and natural science concepts
(overt behavior) justifies a methodological dualism. Well-known
examples are a Spartan who can have pain without showing it and
a simulant who can express emotions but doesn’t have it.
An attempt to base psychology on a purely objective
methodology and to avoid the methodological dualism was
undertaken in the middle of the 20th century under the name
of behaviorism: the mind science should be reduced to space-
and time-related processes like those in any natural science,
i.e., the objectively observable behavior. Behaviorist psychology
was suggested as a scientific alternative to that subjective
psychology based on introspection, which was discounted by
reductionist philosophers as merely ‘‘folk psychology’’. Watson
(1919) and Skinner (1974) proposed their behaviorism as the
only appropriate approach for scientific psychology. This view
intended to eliminate all subjective concepts, and especially
intentional concepts, by observational concepts. The subjective
dimensions of mind should be eliminated. In accordance with
this view, behavioral neuroscience does not have the problem
of the dual methodology because both neurophysiological and
behavioral processes can be described in the same third-person
way.
However, radical behaviorism did not succeed. Already in
the 1930s it became clear that intervening variables cannot
be removed from psychological experiments. Conceptions of
behavioral experimentation proved especially insufficient for
clinical psychology and other fields of applied psychology.
For these and other reasons, the so-called ‘‘cognitive turn’’ in
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the 1960s resulted in an encompassing rejection of the rigid
behaviorist restrictions.
Presently, numerous psychologists and neuroscientists claim
to investigate subjective aspects of mind. However, in many
applications the rests of behaviorist thinking are still at work.
Many leading psychiatrists try to base the diagnostics of mental
disorders purely on patients’ observable behaviors, ignoring their
subjective experience. These attempts are not in line with the
practical clinical work that shows that patients tell us what
they are experiencing (Parnas, 2014). For instance, the use of
recreational drugs could be conceived of in terms of ‘‘reward’’,
but this concept ignores the variety of drug users’ motivations,
e.g., to make new experience or to explore one’s subjective
position in the world. The term ‘‘reward’’ is too general to be of
high explanatory value.
The level of meanings, which is the core of subjectivity
and phenomenology, cannot be eliminated from psychological
science, yet may even have priority building a semantic basis for
objectivation and operationalization of concepts and constructs
(Harvard Law School, 2015). This means that neuroscience also
cannot avoid the methodological dualism if it wants to attain its
declared goals.
Operationalization of Psychological
Constructs
In line with these methodological accounts, it is important
to note that most psychological termini, from pain to falling
in love, have their roots in subjective experience and folk
psychology. When a lay person asks what science (psychology
or neuroscience) can tell us about these phenomena, she is
interested in the meaning these terms have in the ordinary
language. Therefore, subjective experience is the starting
point of most psychological investigations. In consequence,
in experimental psychology (a fortiori neuroscience), these
phenomenological constructs have to be operationalized as
measurable, controllable variables. For instance, emotions are
commonly operationalized as a triad of elements: (a) a specific
feeling and the ensuing cognitive appraisal; (b) a specific
(observable) emotional behavior; and (c) a specific physiological
response. Thus experiential descriptors are combined with
biological descriptors. Regarding this methodological plurality,
it seems to be fruitful if phenomenological constructs have
to be broken down to testable operationalization as it is
the case in the attempts to localize the phenomenological
self in the brain: self-related processing is a testable setup
that helps to approach the brain structures that are at least
necessary for self-perception of a person (e.g., Northoff,
2014a,b).
However, when scientists re-define the terms of subjective
experience to make them easier for experiments, they should take
in mind that a result of this operation can be the terms having
lost the meaning they have for most people (including those
who fund the studies). For example, psychologists can define
their aim as a study of aggression, but in their real experiments
participants merely observe schematic pictures of violence. Even
though the results can be meaningful, they may not give a new
insight into the domain of aggression as this word is understood
by the broad public. Moreover, such operational definitions
of mental phenomena, though simplifying our experimental
work, make an impression that the object of the study (e.g.,
‘‘love’’) is a single mental process, which is not at all evident.
Love is an object-related multi-level process entailing cognition,
memory, expectation, emotion, motivation and possibly other
components.
The said concerns not only experimental, but also clinical
psychology and psychiatry. As Andreasen (2007) pointed out,
some psychiatric operationalizations like rating scales for mental
symptoms may lead to a loss of the phenomenon. Can a system
of concepts be built that allow empirical operationalization, in
the same time preserving links to real experience?
Basic Concepts—Listed but Not yet
Nested in a Network
Psychology textbooks describe several main categories like
perception, thinking, emotions, etc., each of which is subdivided
into subcategories. Together, this means 30–50 significant
psychological categories, whose interrelationships are often
unclear. This indicates the need for an integrated taxonomy of
mental states and processes that can be constructed on the basis
of observational data (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Tanida and Pöppel,
2006).
A well-known functional model taxonomy postulates that
a system entails several elements: a sensor that receives the
stimuli, an effector that generates the behavior, a processor that
analyses and synthesizes information, a depositor whose function
is the storage of information, and an evaluator to declare the
relevance of the results of the processor. As this cascade of
operators is related with the environment a functional circle (von
Uexküll, 1920) can be constituted, which also includes planning
(control loop paradigm) as well as plan-related and memory-
based expectations regarding the effects of behavior. Several
other, more segmented taxonomies exist as they are constructed
mainly in computational cognitive science (Sun and Franklin,
2007).
Intrinsic dynamics of psychological processes can be
illustrated by an analysis of the category ‘‘emotions’’. Thus some
emotional states are opposing each other (e.g., Plutchik, 1991;
Ekman, 1992). Such antagonisms were specified in the opponent
process theory of emotion and motivation, which states that an
adaptive slow down-regulation of the level of neutral emotions
takes place (Solomon, 1980). A similar functional opposition
exists in the domain of color perception (e.g., a red afterimage
after seeing green). This idea of opposing forces corresponds
well with neurobiological findings suggesting simultaneous and
successive inhibition or opposing interplays between nucleus
accumbens as a reward-related structure and the amygdala as
an anxiety-related structure. Similar taxonomies of emotions
have been developed in neuroscience (e.g., Panksepp, 1998) and
philosophy (Ben-Ze’ev, 2001).
The above concepts mainly originated from cognitive science.
On the other hand, ecological psychology (Gibson, 1966, 1979;
Stoffregen, 2000) claims to propose its own, ‘‘organism-centered’’
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conceptual system, which is sometimes regarded as a strict
alternative to the network of cognitive concepts. Although the
ecological view is much less developed, it has several advantages,
particularly a strong anti-atomistic attitude and an accent on the
close-loop relation between perception and action (in contrast
to the view on the action as a response to perceptual events).
Ecological psychologists view perception not as mere processing
of sensory information but as a set of intrasensory actions (e.g.,
touch, eye movements) aimed as an active search for relevant
information (e.g., Turvey, 1996; Noe, 2005). We believe that
the presumed opposition between the cognitive and ecological
approaches has mainly historical reasons, and that the two
approaches are interrelated like Descartes’ axial coordinates and
polar coordinates, and that a future taxonomy of psychological
concepts will include a set of translation rules between the
two.
Moreover, some branches of ecological psychology work in
close relationship with physiology of movement (e.g., Thelen,
1995; Turvey, 1996). Behavioral acts, the main observable of
psychology, are, from a physical point of view, movements of the
whole body or its parts. Nevertheless, psychology and movement
science have been developed largely independently of each
other (Kotchoubey, 2012). From the methodological viewpoint,
psychology suffers even more from this separation because the
modern kinesiology is a strict, highly mathematized science with
a well elaborated, though limited, conceptual apparat and exact
experimentation (Latash, 2008).
Another contemporary development of ecological ideas is
the studies of gene-environment interaction (review by Manuck
and McGaffery, 2014). These studies can be conceived of as
realization and specification of the concept of ‘‘environment’’ as a
subject-related term (‘‘Lebensraum’’: Lewin, 1939) as contrasted
to the definition of environment in objectivistic physical terms
proposed by the founder of ecology (Haeckel, 1899/1992).
We suggest that the difference between the aspects of
environment is closely related to the general psychological
tension between the first- and third-person perspectives. We also
believe that constructive application of the systems approach has
a potential to bridge both presently existed methodological gaps
(between ‘‘objectivist’’ and ecological psychology, and between
behavioral and movement science). We shall return to this issue
in Chapter ‘‘Systems Science’’ below.
Process Models—Towards Integrative
Systemic Computational Models
One of the most stimulating current concepts is the predictive
coding model that conceives of human information processing
as determined by the processing of expected (or predicted)
vs. observed stimuli: activation occurs only if an observation
is unexpected (Sokolov, 1963; Grossberg, 1982). However, if
an expected reward does not occur the behavior is suppressed
(Dayan and Berridge, 2014). The model presumes not only
that experience-based observations are connected with output
elements but also that an action plan is connected with the
observed result by a feedback loop. In this view, reward
can be seen as the result of a prediction error (Schultz,
1998, 2013; Niv et al., 2012). This network-related concept of
reward (Friston, 2012) further stimulated the development of
the fields of ‘‘computational psychology’’ and ‘‘computational
psychiatry’’ (e.g., Montague et al., 2012). It is related to the
neurobiological concept of ‘‘corollary discharge’’ (Sperry, 1950),
which has recently been applied to theoretical understanding
and measurement of altered self-experience in schizophrenia
(Mathalon and Ford, 2008; Rösler et al., 2015). In this case we see
a fruitful integration of several conceptual fields from behavioral
biology to clinical psychology and psychopathology, linked by
neurobiologically based systemic conceptual models (see Chapter
‘‘Systems Science’’ below).
Some further examples indicate new roadmaps to a systemic
psychology (and psychopathology):
– Decisions can be regarded as the result of internal cycles
between cognitive and emotional processes (Heckhausen and
Heckhausen, 2010). This qualitative model is also framed by
the concept of a global feedback loop between action and its
consequences that result in further modifications of action
plans (Miller et al., 1960).
– Binding behavior can be seen as the result of the feeling
of dependence minus the feeling of security (Bischof, 1975).
Therefore, if the latter is strong, the binding behavior is
reduced even with a high level of dependence. Each of these
states and drives is based on other elementary mental states
and processes. For instance, the feeling of security is the result
of the experience of familiarity and closeness.
To illustrate self-organized state trajectories, even complex
constructs such as the self can be conceptualized and modeled
in the context of systems theory as an attractor (i.e., a
certain processual structure) at certain time scales and in the
presence of conditions that may calibrate or destabilize the
attractive self-structure (Tschacher and Rössler, 1996; Tschacher
and Haken, 2007; Tschacher and Munt, 2013). In this way,
issues of experience can be conceptualized and modeled in
a way that allows operationalization and categorization of its
dynamics.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
OF BRAIN-MIND STUDIES
Summary
Models of one-to-one correspondence between a mental process
and a morphological or biochemical structure can successfully
work in selected cases; however, even in such cases further
development reveals that these models are only approximations
whose productivity is limited. Understanding a mental function
as translated into a temporal structure of ons and offs of
mental activities and related to a network model is much more
complex but, as the working memory paradigm indicates, not
unrealistic.
Thus a new neurophysiological or neurochemical finding
always implies a functional interpretation on the psychological
level, and the history shows that sometimes such interpretations
are arbitrarily isolated and oversimplified. To avoid this, a kind
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of a ‘‘neuropsychological uncertainty relation’’ can be suggested:
the more precise is location in the brain, the less exact is the
(psychological) function, and vice versa: the better can we define
the function, the more difficult is its localization.
Levels of Correspondence
Brain-mind relations are usually measured by contingencies
between altered brain variables and altered mind variables.
Several distinct levels of these contingencies have to be
considered.
Correlates are simple temporal coincidences between the two.
The amygdala is activated when we experience fear; the activity
of the hippocampus increases during memorization tasks;
attended stimuli elicit a specific EEG wave lacking in response
to non-attended stimuli. The overwhelming majority of all
phenomena obtained by BACN are neurophysiological correlates
of behavioral, cognitive or emotional states or processes. Some
authors assume that a strong correlation between brain activity
andmental functions indicate that the neuronal activity underlies
these functions. Such assumption is a metaphysical one and
cannot be justified on the basis of the correlational data only.
There are data indicating that social-cultural environment can
substantially affect not only brain function but even brain
morphology (e.g., Paulesu et al., 2000; Bufill and Carbonell, 2004;
Petersson et al., 2007). The assumption, that the brain causes
behavior and not vice versa, is not justified by the mere strength
of the correlation.
Necessary conditions are a higher level of correspondence
that just correlates. For example, synchronous activity of
thalamo-cortical loops does not simply correlate with conscious
experience but, rather, no conscious experience is even possible
(at least in adults) whenever these loops do not function properly.
The necessary conditions may be more or less specific. Finally,
even the basic physiological functions such as respiration and
circulation are also necessary for higher cognitive functions.
Other physiological phenomena can be found, however, which
are more specific conditions for some functions. The most
specific conditions are necessary and sufficient. In this case we
should not only know (like in the consciousness example above)
that whenever a physiological process is absent, a mental process
is absent as well, but also that whenever this physiological process
is present, the mental process is also present.
The identity relation is the highest level of correspondence.
Even if a physiological process is both necessary and sufficient
for a mental process, this does not logically mean that the two
are one and the same process. There are several specific criteria
of identity that are extensively discussed in the philosophical
literature.
Our ability to capture these four levels of the correspondence
between brain and mind (or behavior) strongly depends on
the design of a neuroscientific experiment. Most experiments
have psychological or behavioral independent variables, and
neurophysiological dependent variables. Examples are given
above: the activity of the amygdala is recorded as a function of the
emotional state, and the electrocortical responses as a function
of the state of attention. Such experimental design principally
allows the researcher to obtain only physiological correlates of
mental activity. If correlations between local structural activities
and mental functions are interpreted as causal relations, this is a
philosophical and not a scientific claim.
The opposite arrangement is used in lesion studies,
stimulation studies (including psychopharmacology),
biofeedback studies, or sleep studies. Here, neurophysiological
variables are independent factors, and mental and behavioral
changes are dependent variables. This kind of experiment can
reveal necessary physiological conditions of a behavior or a
mental function.
A combination of the two approaches is supposed to give rise
to identification of sufficient conditions. To our best knowledge,
necessary and sufficient neurophysiological conditions have
been found out only for simplest forms of learning in lower
animals (Linden, 2003). For mental processes such as subjective
sensation, feeling, etc., only necessary conditions could be
identified to date. Although many neuroscientists, including
many contributors of the present text, believe in the principal
identity of mental and physical processes, we insist that this
remains a matter of belief and not of scientific facts.
From Structure to Function
Certain brain areas critically contribute to the generation of
an organismic function. An interesting example is Parkinson
disease with its reduction of motor dysfunction patterns to
a degeneration of dopamine cells in the brain stem (Davie,
2008). The role of this degeneration was first indicated by
post-mortem neuropathology and then supported by means
of the experimental induction of a Parkinson syndrome by
reserpine, and by the positive effect of dopamine transmission
agonists such as L-DOPA (Carlsson, 2006).
Parkinsonism, in which the impairment of a local brain
structure and a local biochemistry causes a clinical neurological
phenomenon, became a paradigm for successful clinical-
neurophysiological reductionism. However, further research in
Parkinson disease showed that a focal view is insufficient
since also glutamate system participates in the development of
Parkinsonian symptoms.
Apparently, simple concepts of locality of functions and single
molecular players had to be abandoned since lesion studies
showed for nearly every area of interest that a partial restitution
of function can be attained after a specific training (Pöppel
et al., 1973; Sahraie et al., 2010). Also imaging studies revealed
that most brain areas are involved in multiple mental functions,
and that each single mental function is related to several brain
areas. For instance, already in the early 1990s Felleman and
Van Essen (1991) identified more than 30 areas involved in
visual perception. A network conception of representation of
mental functions in the brain appears more appropriate, as was
suggested by Lashley (1950) more than 60 years ago.
Above we already mentioned the problem which arises when
very weak laboratory analogs of complex phenomena such as
love are used (e.g., pictures of a beloved person), and the results
are generalized onto the phenomenon of love in general. This
problem further aggravates in neurophysiological (e.g., fMRI)
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studies that frequently use even simpler and more schematic
stimuli, and the activated brain areas are then interpreted
as ‘‘representing’’ or ‘‘involved in’’ love. An example can be
Ekman pictures of facial expressions of emotions as a basis
of ‘‘affective neuroscience’’ (Paul Ekman Group, 2015). Indeed,
these pictures proved to be a powerful tool for the analysis
of emotional expression. This does not mean, however, that
they can be used with equal success in the study of emotional
experience.
This implies that neuropsychology cannot be better than the
psychology it is realized upon. When a psychological concept is
weak, its relation to underlying neural substrate cannot be strong.
From Molecules to Mind
The problem of relating structure to function remains also at
the molecular level: a one-to-one relation between a molecule
and a mental function does not hold true. In the past, certain
neurotransmitters were wrongly classified as hormones ‘‘for’’
particular mental states and processes. For instance, dopamine
has made a path from a pleasure molecule to an addiction
molecule to a reward prediction error molecule (Schultz, 1998).
Oxytocin is often depicted as a hormone of love, binding and
even happiness. However, other substances such as serotonin
and dopamine are also involved in binding. Binding behavior
is a result of a complex set of external and internal conditions
(Bischof, 1975). On the other hand, oxytocin is involved in
several organismic functions such as prolactin secretion. Recent
studies indicate a possible publication bias, in that the studies
that do not reveal a link between oxytocin and social behavior
are not published or even not submitted (Lane et al., 2016). To
summarize, the biological specificity and selectivity of oxytocin
are questionable. Relating one type of molecules only to a
simple concept of folk psychology cannot replace an explicit
psychological theory (Kandel, 1999).
A Partial Mechanistic Explanation—Brain
Circuits of Working Memory
One example of a successful, heuristically useful model that
can ‘‘explain’’ a mental function by neuronal mechanisms is
the model of the working memory and its impairment in
schizophrenia (Kendler and Schaffner, 2001; Lewis et al., 2012).
Working memory is understood as the transient holding of
information ready for further processing like comparison or
prediction of upcoming stimuli. Imaging studies in humans as
well as electrophysiological experiments in monkeys showed that
the temporal structure of neuronal activity of pre-frontal cortical
areas correspond to the quality of working memory function.
A further analysis of the local brain circuitry by special EEG
recordings showed that low gamma oscillations are correlated
with impaired working memory (Uhlhaas, 2015). Histological
studies indicated that structural deficiencies of inhibitory GABA
neurons underlie this dysfunction (Lewis et al., 2012). Finally,
genetic studies showed specific genes possibly playing a causal
role in the dysfunctional formation of these neurones (Lewis
et al., 2012).
This model is a convincingmulti-level bottom-up explanation
that allows us to relate a clinical syndrome to neurobiology.
Heuristically useful computational simulation models could be
constructed whereby effects of different neurotransmitters can be
explored (Wang, 2010).
PHILOSOPHY
Summary
A big problem of modern neuroscience is its lack of reflection,
i.e., the inability to critically ask itself (Bennett and Hacker,
2003). Therefore, the methodology of integrative human
neuroscience has to include a discipline specialized on reflection,
i.e., philosophy. This would permit neuroscientists to consider
often neglected implicit assumptions on whose basis they
work.
Particularly, philosophical anthropology supports our view
that methodological dualism is inevitable in neuroscience and
does not imply any ontological dualism (e.g., between nature and
culture; or between brain and body periphery). Phenomenology
stresses that the brain cannot be regarded as a machine that
‘‘produces’’ mind, but as a vital component in a highly complex
transaction between brain, body, physical and cultural world.
Philosophy of science shows that young sciences have yet to
learn how to avoid overgeneralizations, absolutistic claims and
hyper-constructivist messages (e.g., ‘‘there is no world outside the
brain’’) that dangerously approach solipsism.
Epistemology and Philosophy of Science
One central question is how neuroscience can obtain knowledge
about brain-mind relations. Regarding this, the history of physics
might reveal analogies with, but also differences from, the recent
history of neuroscience. We know from the history of physics
that the ideas are rapidly generalized at the beginning of a new
era of research. These generalizations vanish, however, when
the euphoria of novelty passes. The more details we learn, the
more difficult it will be to tell simple stories with universal
claims.
Another lesson from history and philosophy of physics
is the necessity of an elaborated theoretical neurobiology
that goes beyond pure computation (Edelman and Tononi,
2001; van Hemmen, 2014; Hobson and Friston, 2014).
Neither neurobiology nor philosophy of neuroscience is so
far developed.
Also, philosophy of physics has learnt to avoid both the
Scylla of absolute truth claims and the Charybdis of radical
instrumentalism. It rejects the constructivist view that science
is but a construction of useful models having nothing to
do with ‘‘reality’’. Rather, theoretical progress is regarded
as approximation to the real state of affairs in the world
(e.g., Lakatos, 1976; Psillos, 2000). On the other hand,
contemporary basic sciences clearly distinguish between truth
and explanatory power. Even completely wrong models (e.g.,
geocentric astronomy) may have a lot of explanatory power
within narrow limits (e.g., in map building). A good example
in the neuroscience is the well-accepted conception of an
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EEG signal as created exclusively by gradual post-synaptic
potentials of neurons, as if axonal spike potentials do not
exist. Moreover, we were able to explain a very broad range
of ERP effects on the basis of a very simplified view that
only radial cortical dipoles do matter whereas tangential
dipoles do not (Kotchoubey, 2006). Unfortunately, views on
neuroscience sometimes wildly oscillate between the polar
positions directly contradicting each other. On the one hand,
there are metaphysical claims that the whole world is merely
a construction of the brain (e.g., Revonsuo, 1995a,b; Lehar,
2003). Suddenly, one radical exception is made from this
radical anti-realism; namely, the findings of neuroscience are
regarded as ‘‘objective facts’’ that are not subjected to any
interpretation.
Particularly strong realistic bias exists in discussing specific
experimental findings. Thus a significant BOLD response in,
e.g., the right temporal lobe during a particular mental task
is interpreted as the localization of the corresponding mental
function in the right temporal lobe, while in fact, the finding
indicates at the very best that the right temporal lobe might be
more important for performing this mental task (in the particular
conditions) than other brain regions.
A very difficult question is that of the appropriate complexity
of theoretical approximations andmodels of brain activity.While
such theories typically simplify the real state of affairs (see EEG
and ERP examples above), there is a limit of simplification below
which a theoretical model cannot work. It can be particularly
questioned whether purely linear models can suffice for adequate
description of brain circuits characterized by re-entrance and
self-sustainment.
There is another aspect of modeling also related to the issue
of models’ veridicality. Neuroscientists not only use models but
also typically regard the brain itself as a modeling device, which is
then interpreted in a strong anti-realist sense: the brain is said not
to reflect reality, but to model it (e.g., Metzinger, 2003). This is
a profound misunderstanding of modeling process. Modeling is
not opposed to veridical representation; rather, models represent
real phenomena in a simplified manner, stressing some of their
features and ignoring other (‘‘less important’’) features (Bailer-
Jones, 2009). Each model is a model of something, and thus if we
say that the brain builds a model of the self we admit that the self
really exists.
Neurophilosophy and The Conceptual
Loop
As we have said above in discussing neuropsychology, the quality
of experiments in BACN critically depends on the quality of
psychological concepts that undergo neurophysiological analysis.
Many basic psychological concepts root in folk psychology or
in the philosophical tradition. Generally, the possibilities of
neuroscientific experimentation are limited by the conceptual
framework provided ‘‘top-down’’, from philosophy through
psychology. For example, many neuroscientists try to find
neurobiological foundations of consciousness, but nobody aims
at neurobiology of the soul. This is not because some experiment
in neuroscience has found out that there is no soul, but rather,
because philosophy, cognitive psychology and the present-day
common sense assume that consciousness is a more useful
concept than soul.
However, this is not the whole truth. The fact that concepts
strongly determine the course of experimentation, does not
mean that the experimenters are enclosed in the prison of given
concepts. Thus psychological experiments to such phenomena
as attention and memory have changed the content of these
(primarily folk) concepts. Likewise, psychological studies to
philosophical concepts such as intentionality are able to modify
these concepts (e.g., Iijima and Ota, 2014). The same is true for
the experiments in neuroscience. A careful examination of brain
activity related to self-linked notions and to conscious processes
can even result in a revision of some philosophical models
of self and consciousness (Northoff, 2013). The conceptual
relationships between philosophy, psychology and neuroscience
are not a one-way road, therefore, but rather a closed loop. On
the one hand, philosophical concepts define the primary frame,
in which empirical (psychological and neurobiological) studies
are designed; on the other hand, the results of these studies may
change the meaning of the concepts.
Phenomenology
Many mental concepts were coined in the context of
phenomenological philosophy (e.g., consciousness or the self),
even though the later psychology used these notions differently
from their phenomenological basis. Still a philosophical reference
is useful in clinical psychiatry (Jaspers) as many psychiatric
disorders involve a disturbance of the basic experience of the
person as being situated in the world.
A mind without brain is nothing; but the brain is not
everything for the mind. The phenomenological approach
emphasizes the embodied, embedded, enacted and extended
nature of all human experience. ‘‘Embodied’’ means that the
brain does not generate consciousness as being in a NaCl
solution but only in the interaction with bodily periphery
(including the peripheral nervous system, but also inner organs,
skin, and the motor apparatus). This brain-body system is
further ‘‘embedded’’ into the environment. ‘‘Enacted’’ means that
neither the brain nor mind are pure information processing
machines but work in a continuous interaction with the
environment, in which the organism plays the active role
pursuing its goals notwithstanding environmental disturbances.
This, in turn, implies that mental processes cannot be conceived
separately from bodily processes (‘‘extendedness’’). After the
pioneer publication of Clark (1997), which explicitly referred
to the phenomenological tradition, the idea of embodiment
became one of the leading concepts of modern cognitive
psychology. Importantly, embodiment does not mean simply
the fact that the brain is ‘‘inserted’’ into a body and
‘‘constrained’’ by bodily factors, but, rather, that the interaction
between the brain and the body is the essential constituting
condition sine qua non mental activity (Tschacher and Bergomi,
2011).
Whereas phenomenology has traditional relations with
psychopathology (Jaspers, 1913/1997), links with experimental
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psychology remain weak. The anti-atomistic stance and the
emphasis on the embodied/embedded nature of mind raise
strong associations with ecological psychology (e.g., Kadar and
Effken, 1994). Both ecological approach (Gibson, 1979) and
phenomenology of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1965) have
influenced contemporary theories of perception and action (e.g.,
Clark, 1997; Noe, 2005).
Philosophical Anthropology
Human beings are conditioned by both nature and culture.
For centuries, philosophers regarded man—the only creature
able to reason and language—as the highest being. The present
interest in the animal heritage of man, making biology a leading
discipline, is justified. This interest in the facts of natural science,
however, does not imply that everything in humans can be
explained by natural science. The facts of culturally determined
neuroplasticity demonstrate that humans remain cultural beings
even as biological objects (i.e., in their anatomy and physiology).
This is true that humans should be studied by natural sciences.
But this is not the same as to say that humans can only be
conceived of in terms of natural sciences. Rather, a double
perspective should be defended that goes beyond the opposition
between a fundamental anti-naturalism, on the one hand, and a
reductive naturalism, on the other hand.
Biological (including neurobiological) approach do not
contradict humanity. Biology and culture are not additive parts
that result in a human being as their sum, but, rather, two
overlapping perspectives. Human culture also has its biological
basis. Naturalism does not question the universality of human
rights, but even the opposite is true: understanding of natural
human conditions may help to experience empathy with the
fragility and finiteness of human existence. Just to remember
that a brief carelessness during car driving, or a small fishbone
in the throat, may end a human life. Neither reason nor culture
as such can fundamentally change this natural endangerment
of mankind: as a ‘‘being to death’’ (Heidegger, 1927/2010),
the human being cannot completely rearrange its biological
constitution.
This fact indicates the problem of a reductive program that
aims to translate ordinary expressions of human language about
our mental events and emotions in expressions of neurosciences.
If facts and findings of neurosciences rightly question some
old-fashioned forms of rationality, this does not mean that
we should stop saying things like ‘‘I love you’’. Anyway,
it is a cultural tradition which allows speaking about the
results of natural science. It is not science itself which speaks
but we as cultural beings do it. The legitimate comparison
between neurophysiological processes and such phenomena as
consciousness and emotions does not mean that consciousness
and emotions can be conceived of, or translated, in the terms of
brain responses.
The attempts to naturalize anthropology are very old. The
real impact of new findings of modern neuroscience should,
therefore, be kept apart from the ancient metaphysical claims
of materialism and determinism. These claims are mostly of
philosophical, not scientific, character and possess astonishing
similarity in the 18th, 19th and 21st centuries.We have, therefore,
to distinguish between new scientific concepts and a new brain
ideology. When results of a particular experiment are used to
justify a radical change in cultural practice, this is not only an
undue overgeneralization but also a crude category error: even
a correct statement about what is cannot tell us about what
ought to be. The neurosciences would be on a better way if their
concepts are kept within the reflected limits of knowledge. It is
a task of cultural interpretation to clarify what follows from the
results of neuroscience and what does not. It is a contradiction to
say that neuroscience is the best approach to our mental life and,
at the same time that it is not about our mental life in the terms
we normally use.
Science, and particularly natural science, views the world in a
methodological way. This is not only correct but even constitutes
the essence of scientific enterprise. However, this also yields a
permanent discrepancy between daily and scientific approaches
to the mind. As a person I am interested in all the details of my
own love to a particular person, but not very much in the general
functional mechanisms of love in humans. It is not clear a priori
whether science is suitable to answer questions of our practical
relevance.
Modest scientific realism (Psillos, 2000), which we mentioned
in Section ‘‘Epistemology and Philosophy of Science’’ and which
maintains that scientific theories can approach reality, should not
be confused with scientism claiming that science is the only (or
the main) way to know reality. In its neurobiological version,
scientism asserts that neuroscience is in a privileged position
to tell us what the human mind really is as compared with
psychology, philosophy, art, not to speak of religion and the
common sense. However, while scientific theories help us to
understand reality, this does not mean that these theories are
reality. Science and technology are ways of viewing the world
among others, and the world is already ‘‘erschlossen’’ (which
means that every understanding begins with a pre-conception;
Heidegger, 1927/2010). Reality itself is silent; we are the ones who
talk about it.
Ethics: The Power of Interpretation and the
Neglect of Subjectivity
Several ingenuous publications have been devoted to numerous
ethical problems of neuroscience (e.g., Levy, 2007; Illes and
Sahakian, 2011; Chatterjee and Farah, 2013). In the present
text, we only briefly indicate those of the problems that
have immediate methodological implications. Neurosciences do
not merely present pure facts and theories of the brain but
have consequences for many practical attitudes, e.g., medical
treatment. Scientists often follow the program of searching
for facts and avoiding errors, fiction and ideology. There are
reasons to do so. Nevertheless, there are no ‘‘bare facts’’ without
interpretation. Open to interpretation in science are e.g., the
way you use your instruments, the way you think your methods
lead to the truth, the way you connect your findings with
other findings, the way you put your results into a (more
or less practical) context. In sum, every talk of facts has a
history of constitution which is relevant for the truth of your
scientific work. The power of interpretation leads to an indirect
justification of pluralism in science.
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For example, scientism in the practical medicine can lead
to physicians becoming more and more specialized scholars,
who often cannot talk to their patients as persons. But the
philosophical definition of the human nature has immediate
practical consequences. A physician who regards his patient, like
some neuroscientists suggest to do, as a complex neural network
with skin and bones around it, treats this patient differently from
that physician who regards the same patient as a person (e.g.,
Stier et al., 2014).
Like every mental phenomenon, psychiatric
(i.e., pathological) phenomena can have more or less specific
brain mechanisms. Therefore, it is not incorrect to regard
psychiatric problems as brain dysfunctions. This does not
imply, however, that this neuroscientific approach is a priori
better than other approaches, e.g., based on daily experience or
on experimental psychology. Therefore, we can use chemical
medicaments to cure mental disorders, but we cannot know
without an empirical demonstration that such medicaments are
better than, e.g., personal or psychological treatments.
SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN NEUROSCIENCE
Summary
Systemic approach can integrate theories of different levels
in so far they tackle common problems such as non-
linearity, self-organization or complexity that can emerge
at any (biochemical, neurophysiological, psychological, social)
level. Mathematical models are useful tools to represent
highly complex processes. However, several factors considerably
reduced the integrating power of this approach in the past and
still limit its application in present.
One of them is precocious mathematization. Mathematical
formulations and computations do not suffice to ‘‘understand’’
neural phenomena. For neuropsychological modeling more
conceptual work has to be done. Another negative factor is
theoretical overgeneralization. The ability to think in general
terms is a big advantage of systems sciences. This advantage can
help to overcome the limitations of narrow disciplines. On the
other hand, the advantage easily flips over into a disadvantage
when the terms and theories are too general. Finally, the problem
of the optimal complexity of systemic models still waits for
solution.
Characteristic Features of System Science
Interdisciplinary integration entails a meta-scientific perspective.
Concepts of System Science, such as balance, stability, feedback
loop, self-organization, etc., which are neither material nor
mental, nor social, are needed for rendering neuroscientific
descriptions complete. They can help to overcome particularities
of disciplinary views.
The general features of sciences as listed above are
also valid for Systems Science. The objects of Systems
Science are systems regardless of their physical realization
(including symbolic systems). Examples of typical concepts
have been given above. Regarding methods, systemic models
are often presented in mathematical or graphical language.
Both classical differential equations and graph theoretical
formulations are employed (e.g., Kitano, 2002), as well as
computer-based simulated models. The models are developed
in close interaction with empirical observations. Finally, theories
used in Systems Science (e.g., catastrophe theory, chaos theory,
complexity theory) provide a formal approach to understand
the behavior of systems on a ‘‘supradisciplinary’’ epistemic
level. However, in many cases computer simulations do
not result in an elaborated explanatory theory but only in
exploratory models, whose epistemic status remains the matter
of debate.
Historical Background
Traditionally, classical biocybernetics was used in a higher-level
functional analysis of the brain in order to describe and analyze
global and local control loops. This approach on the early
stage of theoretical brain research was mainly focused on filter
theory, theory of regulation, flow-equilibrium and information
theory (Wiener, 1948; Ashby, 1956; von Bertalanffy, 1968;
Arbib, 2002). Later on, the concepts of artificial intelligence,
especially the concepts of artificial neural networks, were
developed to model information processing in the brain (Arbib,
2002). Artificial neural network models were a breakthrough
in theory building and modeling. They were applied to the
issues of pattern recognition and specific hardware realizations of
this process.
Most theoretical concepts in neuroscience are closely related
to different theoretical paradigms that popped up since World
War II. Thus catastrophe theory helped to understand jumps
in behavior trajectories of living systems, and chaos theory
formalized irregular complex behavior patterns. In consequence,
theoretical neuroscience and computational neuroscience are
fields that are characterized by a high degree of mathematical
descriptions of brain processes (Dayan and Abbott, 2001). The
physical model of Hodgkin-Huxley, presented in a form of
an elegant mathematical equation that describes, explains and
predicts membrane potential of a neuron by the action of
ion channels, is possibly the best known theoretical model in
neuroscience (Hodgkin and Huxley, 1952). Additionally, the
new wave of concepts of self-organization was started (e.g.,
Haken, 2002; Liljenström, 2010). However, mathematical models
should be based on an appropriate conceptual apparatus (van
Hemmen, 2014). The credit of Isaac Newton was not only that
he found the nice formula F = ma, but that he introduced the
fundamental notions of force, mass and acceleration. Without
such fundamental notions, mathematic models in theoretical
neuroscience can, in the worst case, become just symbolic
games.
The early models were criticized for the limited
correspondence to the real structure of the brain. To respond
to this critique, Computational Neuroscience tried to avoid
mathematical modeling that had no empirical correspondence
(Dayan and Williams, 2006). Therefore, this field aims to be
based on experimental data and uses mathematical tools in order
to describe electrophysiological and biochemical phenomena
such as neural signaling (Dayan and Abbott, 2001).
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Other authors (e.g., Markram, 2006) claim that ‘‘data-
driven theories’’ should be constructed, meaning that any
computational model that allows calculation of neuronal
phenomena is appropriate. However, the complexity problem of
data sets diverts the attention from conceptual issues to formal
techniques that intend to identify latent structures in data sets
such as machine-based algorithms.
The Need for Systemic Conceptual
Frameworks
Above we mentioned some examples of mechanistic explanation
in neuroscience. However, the power of such explanations
drops with the number of feedback loops within a system.
Sarter et al. (1996) showed on the example of a heating
device that introducing even a single and simplest feedback
loop dramatically complicates a mechanistic explanation,
because the relationship between the activity of the heater
and the room temperature becomes non-linear. The brain,
with its millions of re-entrant (Edelman, 1989) connections
is a non-linear device par excellence. How mechanistic
explanations can work in such an ocean of non-linearity
remains unclear.
Furthermore, our positive experience with mechanistic
explanations is based on their ability to disclose part/whole
relations. Such explanations demonstrate how macro-
phenomena (e.g., field potentials or BOLD responses) can
be reduced to, and thus explained by, microscopic electric (local
PSPs) and biochemical processes. However, there is no reason
to regard the brain/mind relation as a part/whole relation.
The brain is not a part of the mind. The relation between the
firing of single fibers and the scalp-recorded EEG response to
a nociceptive stimulus is a typical part/whole relation, but it is
clearly different from the relation between the firing of C-fibers
and the subjective feeling of pain.
It should be stressed that the above factors (e.g., non-
linearity) still put serious limits on mechanistic explanations,
even in the case when such explanations remain purely
correlational and do not imply any causality (Craver and
Tabery, 2015). Even if non-linear complexity does not
completely exclude mechanistic explanations, it complicates
them anyway. The ‘‘atomistic approach’’ is nothing but
the reduction of the behavior and functions of a whole to
the properties and causal activities of its parts, or causal
components, and hence it does not differ from mechanistic
explanation. Therefore, the atomistic approach in neuroscience,
which limits its scope of attention to the internal events
(the state and the dynamics of physiological/molecular
components of a complex system), should be, if not
replaced, at least complemented and counteracted by
those views that strongly emphasize embodiment, system-
environment interactions and closed-loop perception-
action coupling (i.e., ecological, phenomenological and
kinesiological approaches), armed with the appropriate
theoretical arsenal including chaos theory and catastrophe
theory. From our viewpoint, systems methodology is the
only one that possesses the appropriate theoretical and
conceptual apparat for integration of these views, still
regarded as separated from each other. Also the philosophical
problem of the part-whole relation is a basic issue of
systems science, as it was already discussed by its founders
(e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1968).
Another set of methodological problems are related to
partial models of neural or molecular brain circuits, which are
increasingly used to explain clinical symptoms. The models use
wiring diagrams representing the mode of action of the respective
elements such as excitation or inhibition. Such diagrams can be
classified as ‘‘qualitative models’’, on whose basis exploratory
mathematical models can be constructed. A model will, then, be
used to deduce an experimental design, and this experiment will
provide data to be integrated in themodel that can be tested again
and modified according to the data. This procedure, already
developed in the molecular systems biology, can be transferred
into neuroscience.
Therefore, a field of theoretical neuroscience appear necessary
that works with central systemic concepts such as those listed
above. However, at least two important questions remain open.
One of them is that of the optimal complexity of appropriate
models. For instance, the heuristic value of complex models
containing hundreds or thousands of excitatory and inhibitory
units seems questionable. What are comparative advantages of
simple vs. complex models (Herz et al., 2006)? What should be
a criterion of the optimal complexity? What kind of heuristic
function the mechanistic models should have (Bechtel and
Abrahamsen, 2005)? What kind of heuristic value do graphical
models have (Abrahamsen and Bechtel, 2015)?
Another, structurally similar question is that of optimal level
of generality of systemic concepts. Above we sufficiently praised
the ability of systems theory to formulate concepts overcoming
the narrow limits of disciplines and particular approaches.
However, the other side of this generality is the use of concepts
that are too broad to explain brain and mind as they describe
any kind of system. Thus such concepts as self-regulation, self-
organization, feedback, bifurcation point, etc. are applicable to
objects that have neither nervous system nor mental processes.
The need for systemic concepts of the exactly appropriate (not
too narrow, not too broad) level of generalization has only
recently been realized, and some progress on this way can already
be observed (e.g., Jordan, 2003; Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014;
Northoff, 2014a; Beran, 2015).
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The simple hope that more data generated by better techniques
would necessarily result in a better understanding of brain
and mind underestimates the actual methodological problems.
This underestimation has serious negative consequences for
both basic and clinical neuroscience. What brain research
primarily suffers from is not the insufficient technology but
the lack of concepts bridging the explanatory gaps between
different levels of brain activity, and between brain events
and mental events. It becomes increasingly accepted that a
simple localization strategy should be supplemented by basic
network conceptions of brain functions. This network turn
should be accompanied by similar network conceptions in
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psychology and psychopathology. For this reason a conceptual
framework of psychology should be revisited and a systemic
perspective should be developed. The concepts of general
systems theory may provide a fruitful basis for further whole-
system research. This does not implicate a simple return to
the approaches of artificial intelligence or of neuro-informatics.
Neither of the systemic approach as proposed here should be
conceived of as dominated by mathematical modeling. Rather,
exploratory computer-based modeling in service of conceptual
models can be seen as an important way to enhance our
understanding of the interplay of emotions, cognition and
behavior.
If a systemic psychology is developed, a co-evolution
of theoretical models in neurobiology and mind sciences
may become possible. However, this development requires
philosophical reflection, particularly concerning the brain-mind
relations. A methodological parallelism appears to be a
pragmatically appropriate position that does not prefer any
ontological position. For this new project of integrating
neuroscience, we assume that a homomorphism of methods,
concepts, models and theories is necessary. In this development,
philosophy and systems science should play an important
part for integrating the various methodological approaches in
neuroscience.
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